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 Included are two essays in the history of legal
 hermeneutics (Peter Goodrich on the influ-
 ence of Ramism on the common law andJames
 Farr on Francis Lieber's constitutional theory),
 several that focus on contemporary problems
 in American legal and constitutional theory,
 and a thoughtful essay by Stanley Fish that
 evaluates the book and criticizes many of its
 essays.
 Historians will probably find the book use-
 ful for two primary reasons. First, it is both a
 helpful guide to recent interpretavist thinking
 and a representative example of contemporary
 intellectual attitudes. Hermeneutics is the
 study (or, some would say, the science) of "in-
 terpretation," the disciplined analysis of the
 ways "readers" determine the "meaning" of
 "texts." Hermeneutics, writes David Couzens
 Hoy, "maintains that understanding is already
 interpretation, suggesting thereby that under-
 standing is always conditioned by the context
 in which it occurs." While the interactive and
 contextualist approach of hermeneutics seems
 "antifoundationalist" and perhaps subjectivist
 (asJurgen Habermas, for example, maintains),
 the contributors to this collection often stress
 its formalist and even objectivist potential.
 "Hermeneutics sets for itself an ontological
 task," explains Gregory Leyh, the book's edi-
 tor, "namely, identifying the ineluctable rela-
 tionships between text and reader, past and
 present, that allow for understanding to take
 place at all."
 Second, the book casts light on legal issues
 that historians frequently confront, most
 prominently the so-called theory of constitu-
 tional originalism (the claim that the "intent
 of the framers" should control interpretation
 of the Constitution) and the indeterminacy
 thesis (the claim that legal rules do not control
 judicial decisions). With its stress on the un-
 avoidable ways in which reader and context
 shape understanding, hermeneutics looms
 inevitably as the theoretical mongoose to Ed-
 win Meese's cobra. Several contributors, in
 fact, concentrate on showing the impossibility
 of identifying a true intent of the Framers (for
 example, George L. Bruns and Terence Ball) or
 on demonstrating that, in any event, intention-
 alism is "methodologically useless" (Steven
 Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels). For bal-
 ance, the bo k includes a thoughtful essay by
 Michael J. Perry that defends a relatively
 sophisticated if somewhat open-ended version
 of originalism, a version, however, that would
 hardly satisfy the ex-attorney general. Similar-
 ly, other essays illuminate the indeterminacy
 thesis. Ken Kress offers a provocative consider-
 ation of the relationship between indeter-
 minacy and political legitimacy; Drucilla Cor-
 nell emphasizes the unavoidable moral
 responsibility that arises from the need to in-
 terpret indeterminate legal sources; and Lief
 H. Carter describes the de facto views of a
 group of state court judges who say that they
 rely for the most part not on legal rules but
 on their own "vision of community values and
 experiences."
 In spite of its strengths, Legal Hermeneu-
 tics may prove unsatisfying to some historians.
 The emphasis it places on the importance of
 contextuality and of the interaction between
 reader and text may suggest that Charles Beard
 and Carl Becker have been reincarnated as
 postmoderns. The book's text-centered orien-
 tation may seem unduly literary (though, for
 hermeneuticians and many others, of course,
 anything may be a text), and its stress on the
 complexity of interpretation may seem exces-
 sive in light of some of historians' concerns and
 sources. Further, the book's recurrent empha-
 sis on context, specificity, and interaction sug-
 gests ultimately that the hermeneutical ap-
 proach - though compelling in its own terms -
 remains more a sensibility than a method. In-
 deed, a number of the essayists in Legal Her-
 meneutics would probably agree with that
 proposition. Finally, to the extent that at least
 some hermeneuticians either disdain the im-
 portance of or deny the possibility of recover-
 ing authorial intent, many historians may sim-
 ply wish to disagree with them and to believe
 that the effort to understand the intentions of
 historical figures - regardless of the difficulties
 and uncertainties involved - is far too interest-
 ing, important, and unavoidable either to
 abandon or to slight.
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